ESSAY

Fertility and Coercion
Amartya Sent

The rate of increase of the world population has accelerated
remarkably over the last century. It took the world population
millions of years to reach the first billion, then 123 years to get
to the second, 33 years to the third, 14 years to the fourth, and
13 years to the fifth billion, with an estimate of the United
Nations that the sixth billion will materialize in only 11 years.'
The size of the total population of the entire world when Thomas
Robert Malthus wrote his famous Essay on Population2 nearly
two hundred years ago (announcing that the world was overpopulated already) was rather smaller than the population increase
during the last decade alone. Even though Malthus's fears and

t Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard
University. This Essay was originally presented as the John Dewey Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School on October 25, 1995, and also at the 1995 Conference on
Population and Security at the Centre for History and Economics at King's College,
Cambridge, UK. The analysis presented here draws on three earlier papers: Amartya Sen,
Population and Reasoned Agency: Food, Fertility, and Economic Development, in Kerstin
Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans Landberg, eds, Population,Economic Development, and the
Environment 51 (Oxford 1994); Amartya Sen, Population:Delusion and Reality, NY Rev
Books 62 (Sept 22, 1994); Amartya Sen, Population Policy: Authoritarianism versus
Cooperation,lecture given in the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation International Lecture Series on Population Issues, New Delhi (Aug 17, 1995) (manuscript on
file with U Chi L Rev).
Note by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Preparatory Committee
for the International Conference on Population and Development, 3d Sess 30,
A/CONF.171IPC/5 (United Nations 1994).
2 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the PrincipleofPopulation,in Anthony Flew,
ed, An Essay on the Principle of Population and a Summary View of the Principle of
Population59, 109-19 (Penguin 1985).
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dire predictions of doom and disaster have not been vindicated-the world has many times more people today, who are many
times more opulent than in Malthus's time-it would be foolish
to dismiss the concern about the potential for excessive growth of
population given the increases that have already occurred and
the continued rapid increase that is now occurring.
Concern about overpopulation has led to a variety of reactions, including the pursuit of coercive population control measures in some parts of the developing world (most notably in
China, but also elsewhere, including partially in India), and a
willingness in many quarters in the West to give favorable
consideration to such measures for the so-called "third world." In
this Essay, I will address the implications and acceptability of
using coercion to deal with what is sometimes called "the world
population problem."
I should explain, before I proceed further, that in this Essay
I do not intend to discuss the moral issues underlying the debate
on the acceptability of abortion. The proposals that are encountered in response to the fear of overpopulation do not relate
directly to the question of whether a pregnant woman does or
does not have permission to have an abortion, but rather to the
question of whether control measures forcibly preventing births
can be imposed on potential parents. It is, I think, reasonable to
contend that if the potential parents, or more specifically the
potential mother, were not free to choose abortion (perhaps
because of the acceptance of the life claims of the fetus), then the
state could hardly be free to force her to have an abortion. The
more interesting case is one in which the potential mother is free
to have an abortion (perhaps because the fetus is not seen as a
person already, or because the matter of deciding whether it is or
not is left to the mother herself), and the question is then posed
as to whether the state can plausibly force her to have an abortion even when she does not want one. There is, thus, an
asymmetry in this respect between the permissibility and the
enforceability of abortion: the endorsement of the latter would
tend to entail the acceptance of the former, but not the other way
around. While I shall not, in this Essay, consider the specific
issue of abortion at all-only the general question of coercive
birth control-any denial of the acceptability or enforceability of
abortion can only add force to the general case against coercion
to be presented in this Essay.
Coercive birth control need not, however, involve abortion at
all, and can take many different forms, including legislation
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about how many children a family is permitted to have (China's
"one-child policy," for instance), or a requirement that the mother
or the father undergo sterilization at some age or after a certain
number of children. The issues to be examined here are specific
to the practices and proposals that have actually arisen in the
particular context of the population problem, and the consideration of reproductive rights in this Essay is strictly delineated by
that context.
A substantial part of this Essay deals with the empirical
regularities of the population problem and coercive family planning, because I would argue that these factual matters are
central to the acceptability of coercion in reducing fertility rates.
In that context, I shall briefly discuss a normative approach,
which I have tried to develop elsewhere, that makes these empirical issues quite crucial to judging the force of rights and
entitlements in general.3
RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENCES

The rhetoric of rights is omnipresent in contemporary political debates. There is, however, often an ambiguity in these debates about the sense in which "rights" are invoked, in particular
whether the reference is to institutionally sanctioned rights that
have juridical force, or whether the allusion is to the prescriptive
force of normative rights that can precede legal empowerment.
The distinction between the two senses is not entirely clear cut,
but there is a reasonably clear issue as to whether rights can
have intrinsic importance or just instrumental relevance.
That rights can have intrinsic-and possibly prelegal-value
has been denied by many political philosophers, especially utilitarians. Jeremy Bentham in particular is on record describing
the idea of natural rights as "nonsense," and the concept of "natural and imprescriptible rights" as "nonsense upon stilts,"4 which
I take to mean highly mounted nonsense that is made arbitrarily
prominent by artificial elevation. Bentham saw rights entirely in
instrumental terms and considered their institutional role in

' I have tried to develop this approach in Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 Phil
& Pub Af? 3 (1982), republished in Samuel Scheffler, ed, Consequentialismand Its Critics
187 (Oxford 1988); Amartya Sen, Rights As Goals, in Stephen Guest and Alan Milne, eds,
Equality and Discrimination:Essays in Freedom and Justice 11 (Steiner 1985); Amartya
Sen, Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J Phil 169 (1985).
' Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies,in A-I. Melden, ed, Human Rights 28, 32
(Wadsworth 1970).
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facilitating the pursuit of objectives (including the promotion of
aggregate utility). If reproductive rights were to be seen in
Benthamite terms, then whether or not coercion is acceptable in
this field would turn entirely on its consequences, in particular
its utility consequences, and no indigenous importance would
attach to the fulfillment or violation of the putative rights themselves.
In contrast, libertarians view these rights as having force of
their own, even if their exercise does not promote good consequences. For example, in a theory developed by Robert Nozick in
his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a whole class of rights would
have complete priority over consequential evaluation.5 Insofar as
reproductive rights are included in this list, they acquire normative priority irrespective of their consequences.
The contrast between the two classes of approach typified
respectively by utilitarianism and libertarianism has been much
discussed in political philosophy. Ronald Dworkin in particular
has used this dichotomy as part of his influential, threefold classification of the foundations of political theories as "goal-based,"
"right-based," and "duty-based" (adding the third as a further category).' The dichotomy between goal-based and right-based systems is sometimes seen as one between: (1) a "consequentialist"
system, such as utilitarianism, where the value of any action,
regulation, or institution depends ultimately on its utility consequences (and the political status of rights is entirely derivative
and instrumental), and (2) a "non-consequentialist" system, like
libertarianism of the kind specified by Nozick (where rights have
irresistible political force no matter what consequences they
have).
I have argued, elsewhere, against the necessity of opting for
one or the other approach in this dichotomy, and I have presented arguments for a consequential system that incorporates the
fulfillment of rights among other "goals."7 This system shares
with utilitarianism a consequentialist approach (but differs from
it in not confining attention to utility consequences only), and it
shares with a libertarian system the attachment of intrinsic
importance to rights (but differs from it in not giving them complete priority irrespective of other consequences). Such a "goal-

'

6

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books 1974).
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 171-72 (Harvard 1977).
See sources listed in note 3.
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rights system" has many attractive properties as well as versatility and reach.8
I shall not repeat here the arguments in favor of such a goalrights approach. But in making comparison with utilitarianism,
it is hard to believe that it can be adequate to explain our support for rights of various kinds (including those of privacy, autonomy, and liberty) exclusively in terms of their utility consequences. The rights of minorities often have to be preserved against
the intrusion of a majority's persecution and the grand gains in
utility that the majority may obtain from such persecution. As
John Stuart Mill-a great utilitarian himself-noted, there is
sometimes "no parity" between utility generated from different
activities, such as "the feeling of a person for his own opinion,
and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it."9
That lack of parity would apply, in the present context, to the
importance that a family attaches to the decision about how
many children to have compared with the importance that others, including the potentates running the government, may place
on what that family should do. In general, the case for seeing
intrinsic importance in autonomy and liberty is not easy to escape, and this can easily conflict with no-nonsense maximization
of the utility consequences (taking no note of the process of generation of utilities)."
It is thus implausible to confine consequential analysis only
to utilities, and in particular to exclude the fulfillment and violation of rights related to liberties and autonomies. But it is also
not particularly credible to make these rights completely immune-as the libertarian formulation does-to the consequences
they have, no matter how terrible they might be. Thus, despite
the importance of reproductive rights, if their exercise were to
generate disasters such as massive misery and hunger, then we
would have to question whether they deserve full protection. In
general, the consequences of having and exercising a right must

See generally Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Blackwell 1987).
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,Liberty, and Representative Government 188 (Dutton 1951).
"0 I have argued elsewhere that this conflict is so pervasive that even a minimal ac-

knowledgement of the priority of liberty can conflict with the most minimal utility-based
social principle, namely Pareto optimality. On this, see Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of
a ParetianLiberal, 78 J Pol Econ 152 (1970), republished in Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare
and Measurement 285 (Blackwell 1982). See also Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and
Social Welfare (North-Holland 1979); Amartya Sen, Liberty and Social Choice, 80 J Phil 5
(1983); Amartya Sen, Minimal Liberty, 59 Economica 139 (1992).
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ultimately have some bearing on the overall acceptability of that
right.
Broadening our attention from reproductive rights to libertarian rights in general, it can be shown that even gigantic famines actually can take place in an economy that fulfills all the
libertarian rights and entitlements specified in the Nozick system. 1 It is, thus, particularly appropriate that Nozick himself
considers making exceptions to consequence-independence in
cases where the exercise of certain rights would lead to "catastrophic moral horror[sl."' As a result of this qualification, consequences are made to matter after all. This is indeed a sensible
concession that Nozick considers making, but it is contemplated
as a somewhat ad hoc provision in his system. In fact, once consequences are brought into the story, not only is the purity of a
consequence-independent system lost, but also it becomes relevant, in general, to consider the relative importance of different
types of consequences (including the fulfillment and violation of
rights and the occurrence of welfare and misery).
The priority that is attached to liberty in John Rawls's deeply influential theory of "justice as fairness" is substantially less
extreme and extensive than it is in Nozick's system." The rights
that are given priority in this theory have far less coverage than
those in the libertarian proposals-and in particular, they do not
include property rights in general. But these circumscribed
rights-primarily those concerning personal liberty-also have
complete precedence, in the Rawlsian theory, over other social
concerns, including the fulfillment of economic needs.
The case for Rawls's form of priority (even though applied to
a rather limited class of rights) can also be, I would argue, disputed by demonstrating the force of other considerations, including those related to economic needs. A form of this argument has
been forcefully presented by Herbert Hart in particular. 4 In

" On this, see Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and
Deprivation (Oxford 1981) (linking starvation to unequal entitlements, with actual case
studies of four famines).
' See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 29-30 n * (cited in note 5). See also
Nozick's discussion of "Locke's proviso," id at 174-82, and his reexamination of the coverage of rights in his later book, Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: PhilosophicalMeditations 286-96 (Simon & Schuster 1989).
' See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard 1971); John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism (Columbia 1993).

" H.LA. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,40 U Chi L Rev 534, 551-55 (1973),
reprinted in Norman Daniels, ed, Reading Rawls: CriticalStudies on Rawls' A Theory of
Justice 230, 249-52 (Basic Books 1975). See also Rawls's reasoned response to these ques-
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choosing between the violation of personal liberty, on the one
hand, and economic penury and starvation, on the other (if that
were the choice), we could have reason enough to opt for the
former. Rawls himself has indicated that this type of conflict is a
serious concern and calls for some reexamination of the usual
interpretation of the priority of liberty.'
In contrast with these "lexical" theories, which generate
internal tensions, a goal-rights system can accommodate diverse
concerns within one integrated and sensitive framework. 6 Its
integrated inclusiveness allows us to attach importance simultaneously (1) to the fulfillment and realization of rights (including
reproductive freedom), and also (2) to other consequences of these
rights (including welfare consequences). In fact, plural frameworks of this type are often implicitly invoked (even if not always
systematically used) in practical debates that pay attention both
to the claim of rights and to the relevance of consequences, including welfare consequences.' 7 Indeed, many advocates of coercive family planning see merit in the personal right to decide
freely how many children to have; their support for coercion in
one form or another has rested on the presumption that, in the
absence of such coercion, the consequences of reproductive freedom would be quite disastrous for economic and social viability,
and for the sustainability of the quality of life to which people
have reason to attach importance. In order to address the advo-

tions in Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 289-371 (cited in note 13).
" Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 297 (cited in note 13) ("The priority of liberty... is not
required under all conditions.").
" It should, however, be clarified that the inclusion of fulfillment and realization of
rights within a broadly consequentialist framework does not, in itself, respond to principal
"deontological" concerns, in particular the case for agent-relative ethical judgments, as
presented, for example, by Bernard Williams, A critique of utilitarianism,in J.J.C. Smart
and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism:for and against 75, 118-29 (Cambridge 1973);
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 202-13 (Cambridge 1979); Derek Parfit, Reasons and
Persons 118-27 (Clarendon 1984); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragilityof Goodness 112-21
(Cambridge 1986). The possibility of accommodating agent-relative values turns on the
position-relativity of consequential evaluation, as I discuss in Sen, Rights and Agency 187
(cited in note 3), and Sen, 82 J Phil 169 (cited in note 3). I shall not go further into this
issue in this Essay, though there is a connection here with the ethics of reproductive

freedom.
"7 Many political observers who are, in general, forceful in their defense of democratic

rights of electorates (including majority rule) were ready to accept the overturning of
voting results in Algeria on the grounds of likely consequences for the well-being and
rights of others under an intolerant, fundamentalist government that would have come to
office. The point at issue here is not whether that judgment was correct, but that such
judgments are made, combining the valuation of rights as well as other consequences.
Many other examples of such "compound" arguments in public debates can be easily
given.

1042

The University of Chicago Law Review

[03:1035

cates of coercion on their own terms then, we must examine the
evidence for these factual presumptions, and see what light is
thrown on this issue by empirical analyses of the social and economic factors that influence fertility rates and by critical scrutiny
of the consequences of population growth.
PANIC-BASED REASONING

Governmental interference and forceful population planning
have often been advocated by persons seized by panic at the sight
of-or the thought of-very large numbers of people and overcome by the reflection that further population growth of any
rapidity cannot but end in disaster. Some have seen the present
process of population growth as a kind of a "bomb": the term
"population bomb" has achieved much currency and use. It is
important to understand the psychology behind this outlook and
the emergency mentality it generates to appreciate why many
people-with much scientific achievement and great general sympathy-nevertheless hastily advocate drastic policies for reducing
fertility rates. A panic can be so strong that there is no patience
to examine the basis of that panic, given what appears to the
alarmed as an obvious calamity in the making.
To consider one influential example, in his widely read book
The Population Bomb, 8 the well known and highly respected
scientist Paul Ehrlich gives eloquent expression to his understanding of this "bomb." The book contains many fine pieces of
alarmist writing, which scare the reader by communicating the
writer's genuine panic. Consider, for example, this description of
a taxi ride taken by the author in Delhi:
I have understood the population explosion intellectually for
a long time. I came to understand it emotionally one stinking hot night in Delhi a couple of years ago.... The streets
seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing,
people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and screaming ....

People, people, people, people. As we moved slowly

through the mob, hand horn squawking, the dust, noise,
heat, and cooking fires gave the scene a hellish aspect.
Would we ever get to our hotel? 9

"

Paul R. Ehrlich, The PopulationBomb (Ballantine 1968).

'9 Id at 15.
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The reader would no doubt be relieved to hear that Professor
Ehrlich did make it to the hotel all right. But Ehrlich's pessimism about getting to his hotel is followed by an even deeper
pessimism about the future of the world:
The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s [he
was writing in 1968] the world will undergo famines-hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to
death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now.
At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase
in the world death rate.2"
Professor Ehrlich's dire predictions have not come true-in
the 1970s or later. Since Ehrlich published this book, the world
death rate has not increased, but has fallen by, on average, nearly a third for poorer countries. 2' Famines have indeed continued
to occur in the world, but not quite where Ehrlich expected them.
For example, in India, production of food per head is nearly 50
percent higher now than when Ehrlich was writing. Famines
have plagued parts of sub-Saharan Africa, regions that have
much lower density of population than India or the rest of Asia,
but that are battered by political instability, military dictatorships, and public disorder, which have immobilized economic and
social development. Fear of the "population bomb" sends many
people into a state of red alert, and scary writings-some much
more extreme than Professor Ehrlich's-continue to flourish, despite
the persistent lack of fit between prediction and actuali3
2

ty.

Fearing imminent calamities, advocates of this line of thinking call for immediate drastic steps to reduce the world birth
rate. These steps often rely upon compulsion. For example,
China's success in reducing its fertility rate sharply through

20

Id at xi.

21

Between 1970 and 1993, the average annual death rate fell (1) for "low-income

countries," from fourteen to ten per thousand; (2) for "lower-middle-income countries,"
from twelve to eight per thousand; (3) for "upper-middle-income countries," from ton to
seven per thousand; and (4) for "high-income countries," from ten to nine per thousand.
World Bank, World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World 212-13
table 26 (Oxford 1995).
'2 See Sen, Population:Delusion and Reality, NY Rev Books at 65-66 (cited in note t).
Ehrlich himself supplemented The Population Bomb with Paul R. Ehrlich and
Anne H. Ehrlich, The PopulationExplosion (Simon & Schuster 1990). This new book has a

similar thesis and received strong endorsements from a galaxy of luminaries, from Edward 0. Wilson to Albert Gore, Jr. Id, dust-jacket endorsements (on file with U Chi L
Rev).
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coercive procedures such as the "one-child policy" receives respectful and admiring attention in this context. Between 1979,
when the "one-child policy" was introduced, and 1991, a mere
dozen years later, the fertility rate in China dropped dramatically from 2.8 to 2.0; the current figure is below the fertility rate in
the United States. 24 Some see a real lesson here for all developing countries. I shall presently examine whether this reading is
correct.
While many advocates of compulsory birth control are not
particularly squeamish about recommending coercion in full and
frank terms, this advocacy is usually more covert, often accompanied by the assertion that "coercion" is an ambiguous concept.2 5
This diagnosis of ambiguity is not mistaken, but that of course is
true of many of the most important ethical concepts. The real
issue here lies in our ability to distinguish between (1) a big dose
of governmental bullying to make people do what they are extremely unwilling to do, and (2) leaving matters to the responsible reflection of the people themselves, helped by the process of
economic and social development. The borderline cases do involve
ambiguities (for example, the governmental provision of incentives may be hard to distinguish from compulsion), but that does
not invalidate the distinction itself. The issue of coercion inevitably involves grey areas, but there are also plenty of black and
white quarters to permit reasonably clear contrasts.
CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION ExPANsION

I turn now to the need for an empirically informed understanding of the nature of the population problem. There are at
least four distinct questions here. First, how critical is the population pressure at this time, and what evidence is there that a
drastic reduction in the rate of population growth is needed right
now, irrespective of human costs? Second, can we expect population growth to slow down and ultimately stop reasonably soon,
even in the absence of coercive birth control? Third, how effective
would coercive birth control be, and what would be its other
consequences? Fourth, what else-other than coercion-can help
to reduce the birth rate, and how quickly would it work?

2

See World Bank, World Development Report 1995 at 212-13 table 26 (cited in note

21).
' For example, Garrett Hardin argues that "the word 'coercion' is not completely
transparent" and that there is an "ambiguity" here. Garrett Hardin, Living Within Limits:
Ecology, Economics, and PopulationTaboos 274 (Oxford 1993).
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The prospect of overpopulation and its attendant dangers
have received a good deal of scholarly attention for a very long
time. Although Malthus is typically credited with having provided the pioneering analysis of the possibility for excessive population growth, it had actually been aired previously by Condorcet,
the French mathematician and great "enlightenment" thinker,
who argued that the continued increase in population might lead
to a "continual diminution of happiness."" Condorcet presented
the core of the scenario that underlies the "Malthusian" analysis
of the population problem, warning that "the increase of the
number of men surpassing their means of subsistence" could
result in "either a continual diminution of happiness and population, a movement truly retrograde, or, at least, a kind of oscillation between good and evil."27
Malthus loved this analysis of Condorcet, was inspired by it,
and quoted it with great approval in his famous "Essay" on population published in 1798. However, the two held fundamentally
different views of reproductive behavior. Condorcet anticipated a
voluntary reduction in fertility rates and predicted the emergence
of new norms of smaller family size based on "the progress of
reason."" He anticipated a time when people "will know that, if
they have a duty towards those who are not yet born, that duty
is not to give them existence but to give them happiness."29
Condorcet believed that this type of reasoning, buttressed by the
expansion of education, especially female education (of which
Condorcet was one of the earliest and most vocal advocates 0 ),
would lead people to reduced fertility rates and smaller families,
which people would choose voluntarily, "rather than foolishly
[choose] to encumber the world with useless and wretched beings."31 Having identified the problem, Condorcet noted its likely
solution.
26 Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population at 123 (cited in note 2), translating

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d'un Tableau
Historiquedes Progr~sde l'Esprit Humain Fragment de l'istoire de la X 6poque.
27

Id.

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d'un
Tableau Historique des Progris de l'Esprit Humain, in English translation, AntoineNicolas de Condorcet, Sketch for a HistoricalPicture of the Progressof the Human Mind
189 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1955) (June Barraclough, trans).
' Id. On the contrast between Condorcet's and Malthus's views on the social aspects
of population problems, see Emma Rothschild, Social Security and Laissez Faire in
Eighteenth-CenturyPoliticalEconomy, 21 Population & Dev Rev 711 (1995).
'o See, for example, his Sur l'Instruction Publique (1791-92), in VII Oevres de
Condorcet 169 (Didot 1847-49).
" Condorcet, Sketch at 189 (cited in note 28).
'
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Malthus thought all this most unlikely. In general, he saw
little chance of solving social problems through reasoned decisions by the families involved. As far as the effects of population
growth are concerned, Malthus was convinced that the world's
population would inevitably outrun its food supply, and, in this
context, took the limits of food production to be relatively inflexible. And, most relevantly for the topic of this Essay, Malthus was
particularly skeptical of voluntary family planning. While he did
refer to "moral restraint" as an alternative way of reducing the
pressure of population-an alternative, that is, to misery and
elevated mortality-he saw little real prospect that such restraint
would work voluntarily.
Over the years, Malthus's views varied somewhat on what
can be taken to be inevitable, and he was clearly less certain of
his earlier prognosis as the years progressed. There is a tendency
in modern Malthus scholarship to emphasize the "shift" in his
position, and there is indeed ground for distinguishing between
the early Malthus and the late Malthus. But his basic distrust of
the ability of reason, as opposed to the force of economic compulsion, to make people choose smaller families remained largely
unmodified.3 2 Indeed, in one of his latest works, published in
1830, four years prior to his death, Malthus insisted that "there
is no reason whatever to suppose that anything besides the difficulty of procuring in adequate plenty the necessaries of life
should either indispose this greater number of persons to marry
early, or disable them from rearing in health the largest fami-

lies."33
It was because of this disbelief in the voluntary route to
population reduction that Malthus identified the need for a forced
reduction in population growth rates, which he thought would
come from the compulsion of nature. The fall in living standards
resulting from population growth would not only increase mortality rates dramatically (what Malthus called "positive checks"),
but would also force people, through economic penury, to have
smaller families. The basic link in this argument is Malthus's
conviction-and this is the important point-that the population
growth rate cannot be effectively reduced by "anything beside the

On this issue and related debates, see Rothschild, 21 Population & Dev Rev 711
(cited in note 29).
"Thomas Robert Malthus, A Summary View of the Principle of Population, in
Anthony Flew, ed, An Essay on the Principle of Population and a Summary View of the
Principle of Population219, 249-54 (Penguin 1985).
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difficulty of procuring in adequate plenty the necessaries of
life."34 Malthus's opposition to the Poor Laws and support for
the indigent related to his belief in this causal connection between poverty and low population growth.
The history of the world since the Malthus-Condorcet debate
has not given much comfort to Malthus's point of view. Fertility
rates have come down sharply with social and economic development. This has happened in Europe and North America, and is
currently happening over much of Asia, and to some extent in
Latin America. 5 The fertility rates remain the highest and relatively stationary in the least privileged countries-particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa-that are not yet experiencing much economic or social development, and that have continued to remain poor
as well as backward in terms of basic education, health care, and
life expectancy.3 6
The general fall in fertility rates can be explained in rather
different ways. The most obvious explanation may lie in the negative association between development and fertility, often summarized by the ungainly slogan: "Development is the best contraceptive." While there is some truth in this rather undifferentiated
thought, it fails to distinguish between different components of
development, which the West has experienced together, including
rise in income per head (economic growth, for short), and expansion of education, greater economic independence of women, reduction of mortality rates, and increased availability of family
planning opportunities (all parts of what may be called social
development). A causal analysis has to be more discriminating.
Gary Becker has offered an important and influential model
of fertility determination. Becker has presented his theory as an
"extension" of Malthus's analysis, with which it shares many
features, including the tradition of seeing the family as one deci-

' Malthus, Summary View at 243 (cited in note 33) (emphasis added). Skepticism
about the family's ability to make sensible decisions led Malthus and his followers to
oppose the public relief of poverty, including the English Poor Laws. On this see William
St. Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The biography of a family 455-60 (Norton 1989),
and the references cited there.
' See United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision (United
Nations, New York 1995), ST/ESAISER.A/145, and Concise Report of the World Population
Situation in 1995 (United Nations, New York 1995), ST/ESAISER.A/153.
' On this, see Concise Report on the World Population Situation in 1995 (cited in
note 35), especially id at 18 table 6. On the underlying causal relations, see also John C.
Caldwell, Theory of FertilityDecline 115-22 (Academic 1982); Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution 343-76 (Clarendon 1995); Robert Cassen, et al, Population and Development: Old Debates,New Conclusions (Transaction 1994).
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sion-making unit with no divisions within it. However, Becker
has, in fact, negated Malthus's conclusion that prosperity raises
population growth, rather than reducing it. In Becker's analysis,
the effects of economic development on investment to improve the
"quality" of children (such as investment in education) plays an
important part in reducing fertility. 7
In contrast with Becker's approach, the social theories of
fertility decline tend to focus on the reduction in fertility rates
that seem to result from changing preferences caused by social
development, such as the expansion of education in general and
female education in particular. 8 This is, of course, one of the
connections that Condorcet emphasized. However, we have to
distinguish between changes in the number of children desired
by a family that may occur despite unchanged preferences because of the influence of changing costs and benefits, on the one
hand, and shifts in such preferences as a result of social change,
such as the modification of acceptable communal norms or greater weighting of the interests of women in the aggregate objectives
of the family, on the other.
One line of analysis, forcefully presented at the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo in 1994, highlights the importance of the empowerment of
women to the development of the decision-making processes of
families and the genesis of communal norms. The Conference resolution simultaneously emphasized the importance of women's
reproductive rights and the effectiveness of women's empowerment in reducing fertility rates. That empowerment is taken to
be positively associated with women's education, job opportunities, and relative economic independence.39

' Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 171-93 (Chicago
1976); Gary S. Becker, A Treatiseon the Family 93-112 (Harvard 1981). See also Robert J.
Willis, Economic Analysis of Fertility: Micro Foundationsand Aggregate Implications, in
Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans Landberg, eds, Population, Economic Development,
and the Environment 139, 149-58 (Oxford 1994).
3
See, for example, United Nations, Women's Education and Fertility Behaviour:
Recent Evidence from Demographic and Health Surveys (United Nations 1995), and the
references cited there. See also note 36, and Nancy Birdsall, Government,Population, and
Poverty: A 'Win-Win' Tale, in Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans Landberg, eds, Population, Economic Development, and the Environment 174, 185-91 (Oxford 1994).
' The newspaper headlines at the time of the Cairo meeting tended to concentrate on
the battles around the issue of abortion as a method of birth control. Abortion was strongly opposed by the representatives of the Vatican and some fundamentalist Muslim governments. A compromise was eventually reached, to which all formally agreed, that neither
condemned abortion nor accepted it as "a means of family planning." This was an agreement on slogans rather than on policies, however; the wording of official resolutions
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As far as historical data are concerned, given the tendency
for these different variables to move together, it is not easy to
separate out the effects of economic growth from those of social
changes (given what statisticians call "multicolinearity"). I shall
pursue this distinction further presently, with the use of crosssection rather than intertemporal comparisons. What is, however,
abundantly clear is that some things "besides the difficulty of
procuring in adequate plenty the necessaries of life" 40 have
made people choose radically smaller families. There is no reason
to presume that developing countries with high fertility rates
cannot follow other countries which have already reduced their
fertility rates through the combined process of economic and
social development (a claim that does not depend on which component of that development plays exactly what part). I shall return to this issue later while examining the effectiveness of coercive measures.
POPULATION, FOOD, ENVIRONMENT, AND DISASTERS

There is, therefore, reason for optimism about the future
prospects of fertility reduction even without any coercion. But
how critical is the situation already? Do we have time to spare?
The advocates of intervention and coercion tend to assume that
the prospects are not merely worrying, but also disastrous, so
they feel that something drastic is called for right now, without
waiting for the benign processes of social and economic development to do the trick. Since the social penalty of leaving family
planning to the family's own decisions is taken to be extremely
high (through hunger or misery), the "badness" of overriding the
family's autonomy is taken to be outweighed by the greater
"goodness" of preventing such a looming calamity.4 '

emerging from Cairo is less important than the kinds of issues the conference managed to
bring to the front. There was also something quite remarkable about the enthusiasm and
force with which these issues were presented and debated by the participants, including
representatives of women's groups in addition to official governmental representatives and
more traditional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, as they are typically called). The
terms of the debate were pushed forcefully in a particular direction by the Cairo meeting,
which was (as Nathan Keyfitz, the distinguished demographer, described it) "a genuine
'happening', not a mere bureaucratic routine." "Because it came," Keyfitz argues, "at the
same time as many other smaller incidents in the awakening of women the time was ripe
for it; it fitted into the historic moment." Nathan Keyfitz, What Happened in Cairo? A
View from the Internet, 20 Can J Soc 81, 83-90 (1995).
Malthus, Summary View of the Principle of Population at 243 (cited in note 33).
41 A case for state intervention in fertility decisions is sometimes derived from a diagnosis of "externalities": a family's decision to have one more child could affect the inter-
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This is exactly where the strong revival of Malthusian pessimism in recent years plays a crucial role. Even the fear that food
supply is about to fall behind the growth of world population has
been persistently aired, despite the continual increase in the
amount of food per capita in the world as a whole and in the
major underdeveloped regions. For example, world food output
per head increased by 4 percent or more for the world as a whole
in the period between the average of 1979-81 and the average of
1990-92, and it went up by 36 percent in China. Even in India
(with its "[p]eople, people, people, people"4 2) food production
moved up by 22 per cent per head.' It is also worth noting that
the persistent increase in world food production per head has
occurred despite a sharp decrease in the relative price of food in
the international market-approximately 40 percent-over the
last few decades, and its concomitant reduction of the economic
incentive to produce more food."
Many different neo-Malthusian concerns have been expressed in the literature, relating to food supply, environmental
deterioration, and residential overcrowding, among others, and I

ests-or for that matter the sense of propriety--of other people. This diagnosis can be
used to advocate many different policies, from changed price incentives through taxes and
governmental subsidies to legal and other restrictions on the family's reproductive decisions. This easy "translation" of interventionist arguments, from standard cost-benefit
analysis to family planning, needs close scrutiny. As discussed above, we cannot but see
family planning as a rather private subject in which-to use Mill's phrase-there is "no
parity" between the family's own direct involvement and those of others. Mill, On Liberty
at 188 (cited in note 9). As Jacques Drbze has noted, "we must recognise that, for most of
us, 'adding a new person to the world' is first and foremost adding a new person to a
family." Jacques H. Drbze, From the 'Value of Life' to the Economics and Ethics of Population: The Path is Purely Methodological, 58 Recherches Economiques de Louvain 147, 158
(1992). Drbze has also pointed out that the fixed-preference analysis of the need for
intervention in the presence of externalities does not readily translate to the case of
reproductive behavior, since "the decision to have a child is a decision to change the
nature of a family," and it is "a decision about extending love to an as yet unknown
person and sharing that person's fate, with all its uncertainties and promise." Id. This is
not an argument to ignore all else, but that "all else" has to be very powerfully contrary to
outweigh the general presumption in favor of leaving reproductive behavior to the family
in general and to the woman in particular.
42 Ehrlich, The PopulationBomb at 15 (cited in note 18).
Sen, Populationand Reasoned Agency at 57 table 3.2 (cited in note t).
Id at 61 table 3.4. It is not surprising that some of the sharpest increases in food
supply per head have occurred in countries such as China and India where domestic
production is less influenced by international prices of food. The serious exception to this
general picture of rising food supply per head in the major regions of the world has been
Africa, id at 57-58, which has been bothered by political and economic disruption of
unprecedented severity. Current problems in Africa call for special attention aimed at
making social and economic development possible; the population problem thus has to be
viewed in the light of these more general problems. See id at 63-69.
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have tried to assess these concerns elsewhere." While many of
the alleged threats involve wild exaggeration (this is especially
the case with respect to the fear of food supply running out),
some of the concerns are by no means dismissible, particularly
worries regarding long-term strains on the global environment,
and on some local environments even in the short run."
In order to resist the case for coercion, it is not necessary to
dispute these worries and apprehensions, or to dismiss the difficulties that are appropriately anticipated. Instead, we must assess the severity of the problems and how best to deal with them.
Given the intrinsic importance of rights, including reproductive
freedom, the problems would have to be very severe (and rather
unmanageable otherwise) in order to justify coercive intervention
in private life and in reproductive decisions. None of the carefully
presented scenarios indicates that things are disastrous right
now, or that they will become disastrous very soon. Long-term
fears do, of course, remain, as do some contemporary problems of
the local environment, but none of the diagnoses suggests the
usefulness of emergency measures of the kind that advocates of
coercion recommend.47
The gravity of the long-run population situation depends on
how much of a slowdown we can expect in population growth
without any coercion. Furthermore, the short-run problems-less
intense as they are-can be tackled by less drastic means than
the brutality of coercion. The alternative, then, is to seek a less
breathless remedy that pays attention to issues of long-run
sustainability as well as the exact process through which the
reduction in population growth takes place. We have reason to
value the autonomy of families and individuals (and the freedom
of decision making), as well as the well-being and quality of life
in the outcomes.
WOMEN'S AGENCY:

A FOUNDATIONAL LINKAGE

One of the most important facts about fertility and family
size is that the lives that are most battered by over-frequent

' See id at 55-70; Sen, Population: Delusion and Reality, NY Rev Books at 65-68
(cited in note f).
" On the local aspect and the importance of ecological balance, see Dasgupta, An
Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution at 269-96 (cited in note 36).
", For different aspects of the environmental problem, see the papers included in
Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans Landberg, eds, Population,Economic Development,
and the Environment (Oxford 1994).
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childbirth are those of the women who bear the children. This is
especially so in the poorer and less developed economies in the
world. It is not only the case that as many as half a million women die every year from entirely preventable maternity-related
causes, but also hundreds of millions of women have to lead lives
of much drudgery and little freedom because of incessant childbearing and rearing.48
The significance of this aspect of the problem requires us to
look beyond the family as the decision-making unit, and to focus
on the specific role that women (particularly, young women)
play--or are allowed to play-in the making of reproductive decisions. There can be a clash of interests here between male and
female members of the family, particularly given their typically
asymmetric roles in child care, and the outcomes of family decisions may therefore not be independent of who governs those
decisions.49 The balance of power within the family is thus an
important issue, especially in regard to the decision-making power of young women whose well-being is most directly involved in
these decisions.
The routes to the empowerment of women that have received
the most attention in the context of fertility decisions involve
increasing female literacy and schooling of women. These routes
to empowerment receive attention not only because of their intuitive plausibility (Condorcet pointed to this link two hundred
years ago), but more specifically because of extensive statistical
evidence linking women's education (including literacy) and the
lowering of fertility across different countries. 0 Other factors in
' See Gita Sen and Carmen Barroso, After Cairo:Challenges to Women's Organizations, in Noeleen Heyzer, ed, A Commitment to the World's Women: Perspectives on Development for Beijing and Beyond 249 (UNIFEM 1995). Sen and Barroso also note that an
"estimated 100 million married women want to avoid a pregnancy and have no access to
contraceptives." Id at 250. Moreover, this number would be much larger if we were to
include those who have not yet been given the opportunity to take an informed and
independent view of family planning.
"9 Sometimes the primary tension may be between women of different age groups and
status. Alaka Basu, for example, notes that in the Indian subcontinent, mothers-in-law
often are much more keen on having a large number of grandchildren than the daughtersin-law who bear these children. Basu has argued that, in South Asia, the important
comparison is often "not between the decision making powers of women versus the husband or male patriarch, but between the younger wife versus the older woman, usually
the mother-in-law." Alaka Basu, Female Schooling,Autonomy and FertilityChange: What
Do These Words Mean In South Asia?, in Roger Jeffery and Alaka Basu, eds, Girls'
Schooling, Women's Autonomy and Fertility Change in South Asia (Sage forthcoming
1996). She argues that "the real pity is often not that men wield so much domestic power," but that "during the prime reproductive years that female power is at its lowest." Id.
'o See, for example, Richard A. Easterlin, ed, Population and Economic Change in
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empowerment include the involvement of women in so-called
"gainful" activities outside the home, opportunities for women to
earn an independent income, the property rights of women, and
the general standing of women in the social culture.
These connections have been observed not only in intercountry comparisons, but also in comparisons within a large country
such as between the different districts of India. The most recent-and the most extensive-study of this connection is provided by an important statistical contribution by Mamta Murthi,
Anne-Catherine Guio and Jean Drbze, dealing with data from
India's Census."' Among the variables included in their analysis,
the only ones that have a statistically significant effect on fertility are (1) female literacy and (2) female labor-force participation.
This analysis suggests that economic growth in itself may be far
from "the best contraceptive," but social development, especially
women's education and employment, can be very effective indeed.
For example, many of the richest Indian districts in Punjab and
Haryana have very much higher fertility rates than the southern
districts, which have much lower per capita income but much
higher female literacy rates and better female employment opportunities. Indeed, in the comparison between more than 250 districts of India, the level of real income per capita is shown to have
almost no impact on fertility rates, while increases in women's
education and economic independence decrease them significantly.52
Developing Countries (Chicago 1980) (including papers by Easterlin, Allen C. Kelly, T.
Paul Schultz, and others); T. Paul Schultz, Economics of Population (Addison-Wesley
1981); Caldwell, Theory of Fertility Decline (cited in note 36); Nancy Birdsall, Economic
Approaches to Population Growth, in Hollis Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, eds, 1 Handbook of Development Economics 478 (North-Holland 1988); Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha
Lee, Internationalcomparisonsof educational attainment, 32 J Monetary Econ 363 (1993);
Dasgupta, Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (cited in note 36); Cassen, Population
and Development (cited in note 36); Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain, and Lincoln C. Chen,
eds, PopulationPolicies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment, and Rights (Harvard 1994).
See also Birdsall, Government, Population,and Poverty (cited in note 38); Willis, Economic
Analysis of Fertility (cited in note 37).
"1 Mamta Murthi, Anne-Catherine Gulo, and Jean Drbze, Mortality, Fertility, and
GenderBias in India: A DistrictLevel Analysis, 21 Population & Dev Rev 745 (1995). The
data are from the 1981 census. This is the last year for which adequately detailed data
are available. The study included data from 296 districts in the fourteen major states for
which data were available; the state of Assam was not included in the census of 1981
because of political turmoil. The fourteen states that were included account for 94 percent
of the total population of India.
" The powerful evidence in favor of these statistical relations has to be distinguished
from the social and cultural accounting of these influences, including the common account-not implausible in itself-that both education and outside earning increase a
woman's decisional autonomy. There are, in fact, many different ways in which school
education may enhance a young woman's decisional power within the family: through its
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AcHIEvE?

How do these influences compare with what can be achieved
through coercive policies of the kind tried in China? Policies such
as the "one-child family" have been tried in large parts of China
since the reforms of 1979. Also, the government often refuses to
offer housing and related benefits to families with too many children-thus penalizing the children as well as the dissident
adults. China's total fertility rate (roughly a measure of the average number of children born per woman) is now 2.0, much below
India's 3.7 and the weighted average
of 5.5 for low-income coun53
tries other than China and India.
It is not hard to see why the Chinese example appeals to
many who are panic stricken at the thought of the "population
bomb" and want a rapid solution. In considering the acceptability
of this route, though, it is important to note that the achievement
of fertility reduction in China has been at some cost, including
the violation of rights with some intrinsic importance. It is also
worth noting that sometimes the enforcement of family-size restriction has been severely punitive. For example, the following
was recently reported in The New York Times:
The villagers of Tongmuchong did not need any convincing
on that day when Mrs. Liao, the family-planning official,
threatened to blow up their houses.
Last year, in the neighboring village of Xiaoxi, a man
named Huang Fuqu, along with his wife and three children,
was ordered out of his house. To the horror of all those who
watched, the house was then blasted into rubble.

effect on her social standing, her ability to be independent, her power to articulate, her
knowledge of the outside world, her skill in influencing group decisions, and so on. Some
arguments against the claim that women's autonomy increases with schooling and thus
helps reduce fertility rates can be found in an important new collection of papers, Roger
Jeffery and Alaka Malwade Basu, eds, Girls' Schooling, Women's Autonomy and Fertility
Change in South Asia (Sage forthcoming 1996). These studies are based on quite limited
information, however, and the issue requires closer examination. Also, if it is supposed
that women's autonomy increases with the general level of literacy in a region (since
overall literacy encourages informed social discussion and value formation), then examining interfamily contrasts would not capture this influence. The interdistrictcomparisons of
Murthi, Guio, and Drbze, 21 Population & Dev Rev at 745 (cited in note 51), show a
strong relationship between female literacy and fertility rates, consistent with intermediation by region-based, rather than family-based, influences on women's autonomy.
' World Bank, World Development Report 1995 at 212 table 26 (cited in note 21)
(1993 figures).
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On a nearby wall, the government dynamiters painted a
warning: "Those who do not obey the family planning police
will be those who lose their fortunes."54
Not surprisingly, human rights groups and women's organizations in particular have been especially concerned with the loss of
freedom involved in this process.5 5
Second, aside from the fundamental issue of reproductive
and other freedoms, there are other consequences to consider in
evaluating compulsory birth control. The social consequences of
such compulsion, including the ways in which an unwilling population tends to react when it is coerced, can often be quite terrible. For example, the demands of a "one-child family" in a country with a strong preference for male children can lead to the
fatal neglect--or even infanticide--of female children. This, it
appears, is exactly what has happened on a fairly large scale in
China.56
Third, any forced change in reproductive behavior may not
be particularly stable. As a spokesman for the State Family Planning Commission in China recently told some journalists earlier
this year, "[alt present, low birth rates are not steady in China.... This is because the birth concept of the broad masses has
not changed fundamentally."5 7
Fourth, it is not by any means clear how much additional
reduction in the fertility rate in China has actually been achieved
through these coercive methods. It is reasonable to accept that
many of China's longstanding social and economic programs have
also been valuable in reducing fertility, including those that have
expanded education (for women as well as men), made health
care more generally available, provided more job opportunities
for women, and-more recently-stimulated rapid economic expansion. These factors would themselves have tended to reduce
the fertility rate, and it is not clear how much extra lowering of

" Patrick E. Tyler, Birth Control in China: Coercion and Evasion, NY Times 1, 8
(June 25, 1995).
' On the general subject of reproductive freedom and its relation to the population
problem, see Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain, and Lincoln C.Chen, eds, PopulationPolicies
Reconsidered. Health, Empowerment, and Rights (Harvard 1994). See also Sen and
Barroso, After Cairo at 249 (cited in note 48).
' For evidence in this direction, and references to the empirical literature on this
subject, see Jean Drbze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social
Opportunity ch 4, § 4.8 at 77 (Oxford 1995).
'7 Steven Mufson, In China, New Effort To Cap Birthrate,Intl Herald Trib 4 (Feb 15,
1995).
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fertility rates China has achieved through compulsion. In fact,
even in the absence of compulsion, we would expect the Chinese
fertility rate to be much lower than the Indian average, given
China's significantly greater improvements in education, health
care, female job opportunities, and other ingredients of social
development.
One way to differentiate the influence of these social variables from that of coercion is to take advantage of India's heterogeneity, and look specifically at those Indian states which have
experienced higher advancements in social development-closer
to China's social achievements, without sharing China's coercive
practices. In particular, the state of Kerala provides an interesting comparison with China. Both Kerala and China enjoy high
levels of basic education, female schooling, health care, longevity,
and so on, although Kerala's rates in most of these fields slightly
exceed China's.5" Kerala also has some other favorable features
for women's empowerment and agency, including a greater recognition, by legal tradition, of women's property rights for a substantial and influential part of the community. 9
Kerala's birth rate of eighteen per thousand is actually lower
than China's nineteen per thousand, and this has been achieved
without any compulsion by the state. Kerala's fertility rate fell to
1.8 by 1991, compared with China's 2.0 for 1992. This is in line
with what we could expect through progress in factors that help
voluntary reduction in birth rates.6"
It is also worth noting that since Kerala's low fertility rate
has been achieved voluntarily, there is no sign of the adverse ef-

's Kerala is not, of course, a country, but a state within one. However, with its
population of twenty-nine million, it would have been one of the larger countries in the
world-rather larger than Canada-had it been a country of its own. So its experience is
not quite negligible.
"' On these and related general issues, see Sen, Population:Delusion and Reality, NY
Rev Books at 70-71 (cited in note t). See also Robin Jeffrey, Politics, Women and WellBeing: How Kerala became 'a Model' 150-211 (MacMillan 1992); V.K. Ramachandran,
Kerala'sDevelopment Achievements, in Jean Drbze and Amartya Sen, eds, Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives (Clarendon forthcoming 1996).
' Kerala's adult female literacy rate of 86 percent is higher than China's rate of 68
percent. In fact, the female literacy rate is higher in Kerala than in every single province
in China. The 1991 male and female life expectancies at birth in Kerala, 69 and 74 years
respectively, are also higher than China's, 68 and 71 years respectively (for 1992). Drbze
and Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity at 215 table A.2 (cited in
note 56). For analyses of causal influences underlying Kerala's reduction of fertility rates,
see T.N. Krishnan, Demographic Transition in Kerala:Facts and Factors, 11 Econ & Pol
Weekly 1203 (1976); P.N. Mar Bhat and S. Irudaya Rajan, Demographic Transition in
KeralaRevisited, 25 Econ & Pol Weekly 1957 (1990).
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fects that were noted in the case of China, such as heightened
female infant mortality and widespread abortion of female fetuses. Kerala's infant mortality rate per thousand (sixteen for girls,
seventeen for boys) is much lower than China's (thirty-three for
girls and twenty-eight for boys), even though both regions had
similar infant mortality rates before China initiated the one-child
policy in 1979.61 There is also no tendency towards sex-selective
abortion of female fetuses in Kerala as there is in China.
It is also necessary to examine the claim in support of compulsory birth control programs that the speed with which fertility
rates can be cut down through coercive means is very much higher than through voluntary reductions. But this piece of generalization is not supported by Kerala's experience either. Its birth
rate has fallen from forty-four per thousand in the 1950s to eighteen per thousand in 1991-a decline no slower than that in
China.6 2
It could, however, be argued that looking at this forty-year
period does not do justice to the effectiveness of the "one-child
family" and other coercive policies that were introduced only in
1979, and that we ought really to compare what has happened in
China between 1979 and the present day. So let us do just that.
In 1979, when the one-child policy was introduced in China,
Kerala had a higher fertility rate, 3.0, than China's 2.8. By 1991,
its fertility rate of 1.8 became as much below China's 2.0 as it
had been above it in 1979."8 Despite the added "advantage" of
the one-child policy and other coercive measures, China's fertility
rate seems to have fallen much more slowly than Kerala's.
Another Indian state, Tamil Nadu, has had no slower a fall
of fertility rate, from 3.5 in 1979 to 2.2 in 1991. Tamil Nadu has
had an active, but cooperative, family planning program, and it
could use for this purpose a comparatively good position in terms
of social achievements within India: one of the highest literacy
rates among the major Indian states, high female participation in
gainful employment, and relatively low infant mortality. Coercion
of the type employed in China has not been used either in Tamil
Nadu or in Kerala, and both have achieved much faster declines
in fertility than China has achieved since it introduced the "onechild policy" and the related measures.

" See Drbze and Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity at 81
(cited in note 56), for sources of data and further analysis.
' Sen, Population:Delusion and Reality, NY Rev Books at 70 (cited in note t).
3 Id at 70 table 2.
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Contrasts between the different Indian states offer further
insights on this subject. While Kerala and Tamil Nadu have
radically reduced fertility rates, other states in the so-called
"northern heartland" (such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, and Rajasthan) that have much lower levels of education generally, female education in particular, and general health
care, have high fertility rates-between 4.4 and 5.1.' These
states have high rates despite a persistent tendency to use
heavy-handed methods of family planning, including some coercion (in contrast with the more voluntary and collaborative approach used in Kerala and Tamil Nadu). Thus regional contrasts
within India strongly argue for voluntarism (based inter alia on
the active and educated participation of women) as opposed to
coercion.
TBE TEMPTATIONS OF COERCION

While India has been much more cautious than China in
considering the option of coercive birth control, there is much
evidence that the possibility of coercive policies greatly attracts
many activists in India. In the mid-1970s, the government of
India, under Indira Gandhi's leadership, tried a good deal of
compulsion in this field using the legal opportunities that she
opened up through her declaration of "emergency" and the collateral suspension of some of the standard protections of civil and
personal rights. That policy had to be abandoned with Indira
Gandhi's electoral defeat, but even now the northern states, as
previously mentioned, have various coercive regulations and
conventions that force family planning measures, particularly in
the irreversible form of sterilization, often of women.65

' Id at 71. Declines in fertility rates can be observed to some extent in these northern states as well, though they are significantly slower than in the southern states.
Monica Das Gupta and P.N. Mari Bhat, in their paper Intensified Gender Bias in India: a
consequence of fertility decline (Working Paper 95.03, Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard 1995) (on file with U Chi L Rev), recently drew attention to
another aspect of the fertility rate reduction problem: the tendency for it to accentuate the
gender bias in sex selection, in terms of sex-specific abortion as well as child mortality
through neglect (both phenomena are much observed in China). In India, these trends
seem to be much more pronounced in the northern states than in the south, and it is
indeed plausible to argue that fertility reduction through coercive means makes this
accentuation of gender bias more likely (as was discussed in contrasting the situation in
China vis-a-vis that in Kerala).
' Aside from the imperative need to reject coercive methods, it is also important to
promote the quality and diversity of noncoercive means of family planning. As things
stand, family planning in India is overwhelmingly dominated by female sterilization, even
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Even when coercion is not part of an official policy, the
government's firm insistence on "meeting the family-planning
targets" frequently leads administrators and health care personnel at different levels to resort to all kinds of pressure tactics
that come close to compulsion." Examples of such tactics, used
sporadically in particular regions, include vague but chilling
verbal threats, conditioning eligibility for antipoverty programs
on sterilization, depriving mothers of more than two children of
maternity benefits, reserving certain kinds of health care services
to persons who have been sterilized, and forbidding persons who
have more than two children from running for office in elections
for local governments (the panchayats).
This last measure, recently introduced in the northern states
of Rajasthan and Haryana, has been widely praised in some
circles, even though the denial of the opportunity to run for office
is a serious violation of a basic democratic right. Moreover, there
is presently a considerable possibility that the proposed measure
will be adopted throughout India and extended to other forms of
political participation beyond local (panchayat) elections. Indeed,
currently proposed legislation in the Indian parliament bars from
holding national or state office anyone who has more than two
children. While many critics have pointed out the deep unfairness of this proposed regulation (including its effect of debarring
large numbers of leaders of less privileged sections of the Indian
community and operating particularly against rural leaders who
typically have larger families), it is still pending as of the fall of
1995.
It is sometimes argued that in a poor country it would be a
mistake to worry too much about the unacceptability of coercion-a luxury that only the rich countries can "afford"-and that
poor people are not really bothered by coercion. It is not at all
clear on what evidence this argument is based. The people who
suffer most from these coercive measures-those who are brutally forced to do things they do not want to do-are often among

in the southern states. To illustrate, while nearly 40 percent of currently married women
aged thirteen to forty-nine in south India are sterilized, only 14 percent of those women
have ever used a nonterminal, modern contraception method. Even the knowledge of
modern methods of family planning other than sterilization is extraordinarily limited in
India. For instance, only half of rural married women aged thirteen to forty-nine seem to
know what a condom or an IUD is. See Drbze and Sen, India: Economic Development and
Social Opportunity at 171 n 58 (cited in note 56).
" See references cited in id. See also Sen and Barroso, After Cairo at 253-54 (cited in

note 48).
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the poorest and least privileged in the society. The regulations
and the way they are operated are also particularly punitive with
respect to women's exercise of reproductive freedom. For example, even such barbarous practices as sterilization camps have
been used in several rural6regions
in northern India in order to
7
meet "sterilization targets."
Indeed, the acceptability of coercion to a poor population
cannot be tested except through democratic confrontation, precisely the opportunity that authoritarian governments withhold
from their citizens. Such a testing has not occurred in China, but
did occur in India during "the emergency period" in the 1970s
when Mrs. Gandhi's government tried compulsory birth control.
The policy of coercion in general-including that relating to reproductive freedom-was overwhelmingly defeated in the general
elections that ended the emergency period. The poverty-stricken
electorate of India showed no less interest in voting against coercive violation of political, civil, and reproductive rights than it
has in protesting against economic and social inequality.
The poor also demonstrate their opposition to coercion by
voting with their feet. As Indian family-planning specialists have
noted, voluntary birth-control programs in India received a severe setback from that brief program of compulsory sterilization,
since people became deeply suspicious of the entire family-planning movement and stayed away from family-planning centers.
Aside from having little immediate impact on fertility rates, the
coercive measures of the emergency period were, in fact, followed
by a long period of stagnation in the birth rate, which did not end
until around 1985.68
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY

To conclude, the possibility of coercive solutions of one kind
or another clearly does attract many political leaders in the third
world (including in China and in parts of India), and there is also
some evident temptation in the West to recommend this alleged
"solution" for use in distant and poorer lands, or at least to applaud its use there. This is frequently a panic-induced reaction to
the misconceived idea of a "population bomb" about to explode,
and it can be thoroughly counterproductive.

' See Drbze and Sen, India:Economic Development and Social Opportunityat 168-70
(cited in note 56).
' See the demographic and sociological literature cited in id.
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At the substantive level, the "solution" to the population
problem that seems to deserve the most attention involves a close
connection between public policies that enhance social development and gender equity (particularly education, health care, and
job opportunities for women), and individual responsibility of the
family (through the decisional power of potential parents, particularly mothers). The effectiveness of this route lies in the close
link between the well-being and agency of young women. As a
result, the solution to the population problem calls for more responsibility and freedom, not less.
To return briefly to the theory of justice, I have tried to use
in this Essay a general normative approach that values personal
liberty and basic autonomy, including the exercise of reproductive
rights. Reproductive freedom is seen as valuable, but not uniquely so. More generally, the realization of such rights must compete
with other consequences for our attention.
This general picture applies to developing countries as well,
despite their poverty. Although it is frequently assumed that
impoverished persons do not, in fact, value freedom in general
and reproductive freedom in particular, the evidence in existence
is certainly to the contrary. Impoverished people do, of course,
value-and have reason to value-other things as well, including
well-being and economic security, but that does not make them
indifferent to their political, civil, or reproductive rights.
Given the basic importance of reproductive freedom, its denial in favor of coercive restrictions can be justified-if at all-only
by suitably strong positive consequences, involving for example
well-being and economic security. If such strong positive consequences exist, they certainly have not been easy to identify. Furthermore, it is not clear that coercion works faster than what can
be achieved through voluntary social change and development.
Coercive family planning can also have seriously unfavorable
consequences in addition to the violation of reproductive freedom,
such as an adverse impact on infant mortality, and especially
female infant mortality in countries with entrenched antifemale
biases. Nothing here justifies transgressing basic reproductive
rights for the sake of achieving other positive consequences.
While reproductive rights were not given any lexical priority
in the line of argument presented in this Essay, it turns out that
the case for them is not, in general, overwhelmed by any contrary
argument. It is a qualified and contingent victory for reproductive
freedom. In the discordant world of justice, there is, I believe, no
other kind of victory.

